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Abstract 
Since 2000, Official Development Assistance has played a crucial role in efforts related to the 
achievement of MDGs. This is especially the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which is the 
world’s largest recipient of foreign aid. This paper assesses the effectiveness of aid and its 
efficient use in achieving universal primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The impact of 
aid is assessed for a sample of 35 SSA countries over the decade 2000-2010. The results 
suggest that higher aid to education significantly increases primary completion rate. This 
result is robust to the use of various methods of estimation, the inclusion of instrument to 
account for the endogeneity of aid and the set of control variables included in regressions. In 
addition, this paper shows that there is strong heterogeneity in the efficient use of aid across 
countries in SSA. 
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1.Introduction  
At the millennium summit in September 2000, World leaders adopted the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to reduce extreme poverty through 
a set of quantified targets, with a deadline of 2015. Out of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the second is to achieve universal primary education by 2015. This is to 
ensure that children around the world will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling. Since 2000, Official Development Assistance has played a crucial role in efforts 
related to the achievement of MDGs. This is especially the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
which is the world’s largest recipient of foreign aid. This paper assesses the effectiveness of 
aid and its efficient use in achieving universal primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa over 
the decade 2000-2010. 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has dramatically increased from (2011) $ 
73.1 billion in the mid-1990s to (2011) $ 118 billion in 2012 (OECD, 2014). In the specific 
case of SSA, ODA increased from $ 27.4 billion in 2004 to $ 42.7 billion in 2013. In the same 
line, the adjusted net enrolment rate in primary education increased by 18 percentage points 
between 2000 and 2012 (UN, 2014). Despite this major improvement, only three out of five 
pupils were able to complete primary school (UN, 2014). Since high dropout rates are a major 
impediment to universal primary education, this latter fact raises the question of the 
effectiveness of aid in general and aid to education in particular. We address this question by 
analysing panel data from 35 SSA countries over the period 2000-2010
2
. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we assess the effectiveness of aid in the 
achievement of universal primary education in SSA. Unlike the existing literature
3
, our 
measure of education is the primary completion rate instead of the school enrolment rate. 
Considering the high level of dropout in SSA, the former measure seems to be more 
appropriate. Second, we consider the efficient use of aid to education by resorting to Data 
Envelopment Analysis. 
For the empirical test, we first check the robustness of the expected correlation 
between aid and education to various panel data estimators including fixed effect, random 
effect, two-way fixed effect, feasible GLS. Afterward, this paper deals with the issue of the 
endogeneity of aid by resorting to an instrumental variable approach. We take advantage of 
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 Note that the choice of the period is dictated by (1) data availability: data are not available after 2011 for almost 
all the countries in the sample. (2)  Aid to education has steadily risen since 2000 with a peak in 2010, and then 
declined by 7% between 2010 and 2011. We do not want our estimates to be affected by this sudden decline. 
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the migration literature by using the GDP per capita of the host country as a source of 
exogenous variation for foreign aid (Combes & Ebeke, 2011; Combes et al, 2014; Bermeo & 
Leblang, 2014)
4
. Specifically, Aid is instrumented by the log of GDP per capita in migrant 
destination countries weighted by the bilateral migration share. As shown by Bermeo & 
Leblang (2014), the size of the immigrant population from a recipient country residing in a 
donor country is an important determinant of dyadic aid commitments. In fact, the donors can 
use aid to develop the sending countries and reduce the flows of immigrants. Besides, 
migrants already residing in the donor countries can mobilize to lobby for additional aid in 
their home countries. In addition this paper contributes to the existing literature by providing 
an evaluation of the efficiency in the use of foreign aid to education. For this end, we compute 
specific efficiency score by country using data envelopment analysis and we define their 
potential predictors by using a Tobit model. 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives a summary of the previous studies. 
The econometric model and data are described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results on 
aid effectiveness. Section 5 is about the efficiency of aid to education. Then section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Summary of the previous studies 
The literature on the effect of aid to education remains very scarce especially when education 
is used as outcome of interest. In this section, we review the most recent papers that have 
addressed the effect of aid either on school enrolment or on primary completion rate. 
The pioneer paper of Michaelowa and Weber (2007) analyze the effect of aid to education on 
rate of achievement in school enrolments at the primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
Using various estimators (OLS, GMM & 2SLS) over the period 1975-2004, they found small 
positive correlations between education aid and school enrolments. Dreher et al (2008) use 
total aid commitment to education to explain the net primary enrolment rate in developing 
countries over the period 1970-2004. Using the General Method of Moment (GMM) on a 
dynamic specification, they find that higher per capita aid significantly increase primary 
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instrument. 
school enrolment rate. In contrast to other studies, they find no evidence that aid work by 
increasing government spending on education. Likewise, D’Aiglepierre and Wagner (2010) 
use data on aid commitment over the period 1999-2007 and find a strong positive effect of aid 
to primary education on school enrolment rate and gender parity. They also find a negative 
effect on repetition rate. This positive effect is confirmed by the recent papers of Christensen 
et al (2011) and Riddell (2012).  
Overall the above papers indicate a positive relationship between aid and human capital. 
However, they do not address the specificity of sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, 
most of the studies use school enrolment rate as the dependent variable which may not be 
appropriate in case of high rate of dropout in primary education.  Our study tries to address 
this gap in the literature. 
3.Econometric model and data 
Following Aiglepierre and Wagner (2010), Michaelowa and Weber (2007), our baseline 
specification is as follows: 
                       
                                                                        (1) 
In the specification (1)        is the logarithm of the primary completion rate for country   at 
time  . It measures the percentage of pupils completing the last year of primary education. 
This indicator has been chosen for two main reasons. First, choosing primary education 
instead of the other levels of education is consistent with the second target of Millenium 
Development Goals (MDGs) which is achieving universal primary education by 2015. 
Second, unlike the school enrolment rate which is commonly used in the literature, this 
measure takes into account those who dropped out of school before the end of the primary 
level. In fact school enrolment rate could be misleading, especially in cases where we face a 
high dropout of school rate. In addition, as suggested by Clement (2004) rising enrollment 
rate came at the cost of deteriorating quality of education. As pointed out by (Dreher et al, 
2008), aid can have a little effect on primary completion rate in recipient countries with a 
completion rate close to 100%. Following Fielding et al (2005), we deal with this problem by 
using a Logit transformation of our dependent variable
5
. Our interest variable is        and 
represents the total aid disbursement for education in percentage of GDP. It captures the aid 
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results, we report this result only as robustness check (See Table A.2 in Appendix). 
 
disbursement for primary education, basic life skills for youths and adults and early childhood 
education. We use this measure in our baseline model because we assume that aid is not 
fungible and it is more likely that the amount of aid which is devoted to primary education 
might be used for other education purposes. In this baseline regression, we always compare 
multisector aid and sector specific aid. In fact donors may have supported educational projects 
through aid that is not picked up in sector specific data. For robustness check, we also make 
use of aid to primary education. In the aid literature, aid is often defined relative to the GDP 
of the recipient country. However, aid per capita help accounting for the number of people 
among whom the resources devoted to education must be shared (Dreher et al, 2008). In this 
vein, we further use aid per capita in specifications as robustness check. 
Data are drawn from the African Development Indicators (2012). Explanatory variables 
include saving in percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment, teacher-pupil ratio, GDP per 
capita, governance measured by the control of corruption and governance effectiveness, and 
democracy captured by the polity IV index
6
. One could also include public spending in 
education. However, it is likely that a huge part of spending in education is funded by aid 
allocated to education.  Moreover, using spending on education would lead to insufficient 
number of observation for estimation
7
. Nevertheless, we control for the spending effect using 
the GDP per capita. While including governance and democracy, we control for potential 
mismanagement of foreign aid and institutional quality. In the same vein, we add the teacher-
pupil ratio to control for the potential effect of the class size on the primary completion rate. 
In fact, a low number of teachers per pupils may discourage people to attend school and 
therefore lower the primary completion rate. Saving enters the model to control for the fact 
that aid could me more effective in context where saving is very low. Data on governance are 
taken from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. The polity IV variable 
comes from the polity project of Center for systematic Peace. The rest of the control variables 
are from the World Development Indicator of the World Bank. Data are collected for 35 Sub-
Saharan African countries over the period 2000-2010
8
. Table A.1 (in Appendix) provides the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in regression. 
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 It is worth mentioning that teacher-pupil ratio and governance measures are not included in the baseline model, 
but as additional controls in robustness checks.  
7
 Note that previous studies including Dreher et al (2008) did not find any effect of public spending on education.  
8
 The list of countries is presented in Appendix.  
4. Assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid 
 
4.1. Preliminar evidences on aid effectiveness 
We start this empirical investigation by contrasting the results from various panel data 
estimators. Table 1 provides the results from two estimation methods, namely pooled OLS 
(Columns 2 & 3) and FE estimator (columns 4 & 5). The next to last row reports the results of 
poolability test based on the Fisher distribution. The null hypothesis that data can be pooled is 
rejected at the 1% level. For each of these estimators, we always compare the respective 
effects of the total amount of aid and aid to education. In the two models, aid positively 
affects the primary completion rate. However, in both cases, the magnitude of the multisector 
aid effect is higher than that of aid to education. We interpret this finding as a proof of the 
fungibility of global aid and the existence of spillover effects from other sectors such as health 
sector. Similar results are obtained when we use random effect estimates, feasible GLS and 
two-way fixed effects. However, it is worth mentioning that in the latter case, the global aid is 
no longer significant. 
 
     Table 1 & 2 around here 
 
4.2. Instrumental variable estimates 
Estimating equation (1) with OLS leads to inconsistent estimates if foreign aid is correlated 
with an unobserved component that may potentially explain the primary completion rate. For 
instance, it could happen that countries with poor education performance receive more aid. In 
this case, the effect of aid will be underestimated. To address this issue, we use an 
instrumental variable approach which relies on the choice of exogenous instrument for aid. 
The novelty of our approach is to test an instrumental variable which has not yet been used in 
the aid literature, but which is currently used to infer the causal effect of remittances. 
Specifically, the instrument tested is the GDP per capita of migrant’s host countries weighted 
by the share of bilateral migrations (Ebeke & Combes, 2011; Combes et al, 2014). The 
instrument is computed as follows: 
     
  ∑                                                                                                                 (2) 
In equation (2),      
  represents the real GDP per capita of the destination country  , and      
the bilateral migration share measured as the number of migrants of country   living in 
country   divided by the number of migrants from country   living abroad during each decade 
 . Data on this instrument are drawn from Combes et al (2014)9. 
While this instrument has never been used as an exogenous source of variation for aid, several 
arguments may justify this choice. First, our instrument assumes that the conjuncture in 
donor’s countries is very much correlated with the amount of aid. As shown by Fuchs et al 
(2013), aid decreases when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate in donor countries. Second, 
the literature often uses geographical and cultural distance between donors and recipients as 
instrumental variable to assess the causal effect of aid (Tavarez, 2003; Rajan & Subramanian, 
2008). Since migrants are more likely to move to the country with which they share historical 
and cultural links, our instrumentation strategy is consistent with the existing literature. 
Moreover, as shown by Bermeo and Leblang (2014), it is likely that the size of immigrant 
population from a recipient country, residing in a donor country is a powerful determinant of 
aid commitment. They argue that donors use foreign aid to increase development in targeted 
sending area and decrease the demand for entry into donor countries. In the same line, 
migrants already residing in donor countries mobilize to lobby for additional aid to their 
homeland. 
The results of the IV regressions are presented in Table 3. The first and third columns reports 
the first stage estimates and show that our instrument is strongly and positively associated 
with both measures of foreign aid. The instruments are significant at the 1% level in the first 
stage regression. Moreover, the F-test statistic is always above the rule of Thumb of 10 
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). Turning to the results, Table 3 points to a positive and 
significant effect of aid on education at 1% level. Specifically a 1% increase of aid to 
education leads to 0.20% increase of the primary completion rate. However, as seen in the 
simple OLS estimation, the magnitude of global aid’s effect is much higher. Our findings are 
consistent with the previous studies which use school enrolment as dependent variable (see 
Dreher et al, 2008; Christensen et al, 2011).  
 
    Table 3 around here 
 
In order to check for the robustness of the results, we carried out various tests. First, although 
the time dimension is small compared to the individual dimension in our model, we run a new 
regression using data averaged over 5 years. This is to ensure that the previous results are not 
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driven by business cycle effects and measurement errors. The estimates are reported in Table 
4. The effect of aid remains significant at 10% level. The magnitude of the effect of education 
aid slightly increases while the one of global aid decreases in the same way. Second, we add 
more controls into the model including governance and the pupil to teacher ratio. Moreover, 
we include as dependent variable aid to primary education. The effect of aid is still significant 
at the 1% level, but the magnitude substantially decreases. One notable fact is that the effect 
of aid to primary education is higher than the one of total education aid. Table 5 shows that a 
one percent increase of aid to primary education induces 0.22% rise of primary completion 
rate. Finally, we run a regression using aid in per capita. The results are reported in Table 6 
and suggest a strong positive effect of aid on primary education. 
 
   Table 4 & Table 5 & Table 6 around here 
 
Overall, both OLS and IV estimates suggest a positive and significant effect of aid to 
education on the primary completion rate. This effect is robust to various specifications and 
measures of aid. 
 
5. Assessing the efficiency of foreign aid 
The main objective of this section is to assess how efficient is the use of foreign aid in Sub-
Saharan Africa countries. To this end, we resort to the Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) which is 
a non-parametric technique aiming at measuring the efficiency of Decision-Making-Units. 
Three main reasons justify this choice. First, using DEA avoid making strong assumptions on 
the functional form or on the distribution of the inefficiency terms. Second, with the DEA 
method, we explicitly account for the nature of the return to scale. Finally, the DEA technique 
has been extensively used in the literature and therefore provides a good starting point of 
comparison with the existing literature
10
. We use an input oriented efficiency with variable 
return scale. That is we are looking for the countries that was able to reach a fixed level of 
primary completion rate with a minimum amount of aid. Aid to education is used as input 
while the primary completion rate is the output.
11
 Data are averaged over the decade 2000-
2010.  
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 Aid is orthogonalized prior use in the dynamic programing. 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of efficiency scores across Sub-Saharan countries
12
. The 
Figure shows that the efficiency is unevenly distributed across countries. The most efficient 
countries are Botswana, Kenya and Togo while the less efficient are Rwanda, Burkina Faso 
and Niger. Understanding the difference between the best performer and the worst requires 
taking a closer look at the specific characteristics of countries. We specifically compare 
Botswana which is at the top of the distribution of efficiency scores with Niger which is stuck 
at the bottom. As we can see in Table A4 & A5, in Botswana, which receive 0.08 USD (2005) 
per capita of aid, the primary completion stands at 95.04%. This is far higher than 29.42% 
which is observed in Niger which received over the decade 1.2 USD per capita of aid. 
Likewise, the GDP per capita
13
 of Botswana is more than twenty times the one of Niger and 
the former has better governance. Finally, the number of pupils per teacher is 51 in Niger 
while it is 26 in Botswana. Although they were not at the same initial level in 2000
14
, all those 
facts suggest that le level of GDP per capita, the level of governance and the pupil to teacher 
ratio may have played an important role in explaining the difference between the two 
countries. In order to have more insight about the potential predictors of efficiency, we run a 
naïve Tobit model using as controls: the initial level of education measured by the primary 
completion rate at year 2000, the urban population, the quality of the regulation as a measure 
of governance, a one zero dummy to capture the potential effects of conflicts, the level of 
GDP per capita and the initial level of aid to education. We suspect that countries with low 
initial level of education may lack skilled people to manage aid disbursement efficiently. On 
contrary, we expect a positive effect of urban population on efficiency. In fact, urban 
population is more open to the world and more able to adopt new ideas and practices. Since 
better governance implies efficient use of resources, we expect a positive effect of the quality 
of regulation. Likewise richer countries have more and better infrastructure that catalyze the 
effect of aid. Finally, we expect that countries which have experienced recent conflict exhibit 
low level of efficiency. Table 7 presents the results of the Tobit model. We adopt two 
specifications: in the first one the efficiency is positively correlated with the urban population, 
the quality of the regulation and the level of GDP. In the second specification, we add the 
initial level of education and the initial level of aid. We find that the efficiency is positively 
correlated with the initial level of education while it is negatively correlated with aid.  
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 Table A3 in appendix reports the values of the efficiency scores by country. Note that all the countries 
reported belong to the final sample used in IV regression. 
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 Within the sample. 
14
 We acknowledge the fact that probably the better way to compare countries is to take quite similar countries 
which were at the same level in 2000. 
Overall, the empirical analysis suggests that aid to education has a positive and significant 
effect on the primary completion rate is Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, some countries use 
aid more efficiently than others. Finally, the main drivers of the efficiency are namely the size 
of urban population, the quality of regulation, the initial level of education and the initial level 
of aid. 
   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The issue of aid effectiveness has always been a major concern in the literature of 
international development. While some studies find no correlation between aid and economic 
growth, others observe that it has helped to enhance some factors of growth in Africa and that 
more could be done if aid resources were allocated to pro-poor sectors. 
In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of sector specific aid for 35 SSA countries over the 
period 2000-2010, with the education millennium goal as a target. In addition, we evaluate the 
efficiency of the use of aid resources within the Data Envelopment Analysis Framework. The 
results suggest that higher aid to education significantly increases primary completion rate. 
This result is robust to the use of various methods of estimation, the inclusion of instrument to 
account for the endogeneity of aid and the set of control variables included in regressions. In 
addition, this paper shows that there is strong heterogeneity in the efficient use of aid. 
Especially, countries like Botswana, Togo and Kenya are at the top of the distribution of 
efficiency scores while Burkina Faso, Niger and Rwanda do not make an efficient use of aid 
to education. Finally, the paper shows that the efficient use of aid is positively correlated with 
the size of urban population, the level of development, the quality of governance and the 
initial level of education.  
These results follow the findings of previous studies according to which aid is effective in 
building human capital in developing countries.   
These findings imply that initiatives toward an increase of aid devoted to education should be 
encouraged. This is especially relevant for SSA whom aid to basic education declined by 7% 
between 2010 and 2011.  
 
   
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure 1: Distribution of efficiency scores across countries 
 
Note: Countries in red are the most efficient countries 
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Table 1: Aid to education and primary completion rate, OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable:  Pooled OLS OLS Fixed Effects 
Log(Primary completion rate)         
Log(Aid in % of GDP) 0.0565* 
 
0.0753** 
 
 
(0.0338) 
 
(0.0360) 
 Log(Aid to education% of GDP) 
 
0.0360** 
 
0.0535** 
  
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0207) 
Saving in % of GDP 0.00712*** 0.00683*** -0.00660** -0.00544** 
 
(0.00194) (0.00205) (0.00266) (0.00221) 
FDI in % of GDP 0.00486 0.00540* -0.000206 -0.000244 
 
(0.00308) (0.00313) (0.00205) (0.00202) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.289*** 0.240*** 1.153*** 1.155*** 
 
(0.0383) (0.0305) (0.298) (0.253) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.00773* 0.00761* 0.0160 0.0101 
 
(0.00397) (0.00394) (0.0170) (0.0145) 
Constant 2.205*** 2.626*** -2.649 -2.495 
 
(0.171) (0.127) (1.773) (1.521) 
Observations 246 203 246 203 
F-Test 55.98 46.60 7.963 8.415 
Adjusted R squared 0.383 0.381 0.454 0.417 
Poolability test 
   
50.50 
Number of countries     35 35 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2: Aid to education and primary completion rate, TFE, RE and FGLS 
Dependent Variable:  Twoway fixed effect Random effect estimator Feasible GLS 
Log(Primary completion rate)             
Log(Aid in % of GDP) 0.0148 
 
0.119*** 
 
0.0313* 
 
 
(0.0178) 
 
(0.0359) 
 
(0.0168) 
 Log(Aid to education% of GDP) 
 
0.0397*** 
 
0.0680*** 
 
0.0219*** 
  
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0183) 
 
(0.00787) 
Saving in % of GDP -0.00629*** -0.00483** -0.00495* -0.00330 0.000137 0.00108 
 
(0.00175) (0.00199) (0.00293) (0.00234) (0.00116) (0.00130) 
FDI in % of GDP -0.00278 -0.00378 -0.000443 -0.00159 0.000285 -0.00226 
 
(0.00217) (0.00251) (0.00229) (0.00160) (0.00177) (0.00198) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.393** 0.191 0.609*** 0.493*** 0.290*** 0.244*** 
 
(0.166) (0.186) (0.126) (0.0975) (0.0289) (0.0233) 
Democracy index-Polity4 -0.00366 -0.00377 0.0214** 0.0192** 0.0124*** 0.0134*** 
 
(0.00914) (0.00959) (0.00954) (0.00758) (0.00363) (0.00308) 
Constant 0.354 -0.377*** 
    
 
(0.616) (0.112) 
    Constant 1.185 3.624*** 0.646 1.490*** 2.277*** 2.657*** 
 
(1.380) (0.972) (0.710) (0.544) (0.155) (0.120) 
Observations 246 203 246 203 245 202 
Adjusted R squared 0.902 0.913 0.345 0.346 
  Test of the OID restriction fixed versus random 
   
41.97 
  Wald Chi2(5) 
    
163.27 224.20 
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 34 34 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: Aid to education and primary completion rate, 2SLS estimates 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Primary completion rate) First step  
First step 
 
Saving in % of GDP 0.005 -0.010*** -0.001 -0.006*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
FDI in % of GDP 0.007 -0.005 0.017 -0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.301 0.851*** -1.724* 1.037*** 
 
(0.261) (0.162) (0.907) (0.202) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.049** -0.019 0.026 -0.000 
  (0.025) (0.014) (0.041) (0.010) 
Log(GDP per capita host 
countries) 
0.939*** 
 
2.220*** 
 
  (0.182)   (0.496)   
Log(Aid in % of GDP)  
0.504*** 
  
 
 
(0.111) 
  
Log(Aid to education% of GDP)    
0.201*** 
        (0.055) 
Number of observations 215 215 173 173 
No of countries 
 
29 
 
28 
F-stat for weak ident. 
 
26.577 
 
20.028 
Shea R2   0.124   0.155 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Robustness Check, 2SLS with five year average data 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Primary completion rate) First step  
First step 
 
Saving in % of GDP -0.004 -0.004 -0.013 -0.003 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.028) (0.010) 
FDI in % of GDP 0.042* -0.016 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.054) (0.020) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.020 0.638 -2.112 1.196*** 
 
(0.584) (0.529) (1.888) (0.343) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.010 -0.016 0.035 -0.021 
  (0.045) (0.032) (0.094) (0.027) 
Log(GDP per capita 
host countries) 
1.097*** 
 
2.089** 
 
  (0.337)   (0.883)   
Log(Aid in % of GDP) 
 
0.494* 
  
 
 
(0.269) 
  
Log(Aid to education% of GDP) 
  
0.260* 
        (0.146) 
Number of observations 54 54 54 54 
No of countries 
 
27 
 
27 
F-stat for weak ident. 
 
10.599 
 
5.598 
Shea R2   0.272   0.209 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness check, 2SLS with additional controls 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Primary completion rate) First step  
First step 
 
Saving in % of GDP 0.007 -0.008*** 0.007 -0.006*** 
 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) 
FDI in % of GDP 0.015 -0.005 0.015 -0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.926*** 1.306*** -2.525*** 1.189*** 
 
(0.642) (0.164) (0.944) (0.205) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.024 -0.002 0.029 0.001 
 
(0.039) (0.013) (0.053) (0.015) 
Governance effectiveness 1.012*** 0.041 1.099** 0.008 
 
(0.362) (0.119) (0.467) (0.128) 
Control of Corruption -0.561* 0.009 -0.647* 0.019 
 
(0.292) (0.097) (0.338) (0.095) 
Pupil to teacher ratio 0.020* -0.001 0.020 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) 
Log(GDP per capita host countries) 2.473*** 
 
2.841*** 
 
  (0.374)   (0.462)   
Log(Aid to primary education in % of GDP)  
0.229*** 
  
  
(0.048) 
  
Log(Aid to education% of GDP)    
0.187*** 
        (0.044) 
N 176 176 157 157 
No of countries 
 
27 
 
27 
F-stat for weak ident. 
 
43.657 
 
37.762 
Shea R2   0.236   0.236 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Robustness check, 2SLS with aid per capita 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Primary completion rate) First step  
First step 
 
Saving in % of GDP -0.000 -0.006*** 0.000 -0.007*** 
 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
FDI in % of GDP 0.017 -0.004 0.013 -0.005 
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.742 0.841*** -0.275 0.854*** 
 
(0.906) (0.223) (0.598) (0.219) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.026 -0.000 0.042 -0.008 
  (0.041) (0.010) (0.032) (0.012) 
Log(GDP per capita host countries) 2.211*** 
 
1.441*** 
 
  (0.495)   (0.339)   
Log(Aid to education per capita)  
0.202*** 
  
  
(0.055) 
  
Log(Aid to primary education per capita) 
  
0.321*** 
        (0.088) 
N 173 173 218 218 
No of countries 
 
28 
 
29 
F-stat for weak ident. 
 
19.977 
 
18.030 
Shea R2   0.154   0.099 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Determinants of the efficiency in the use of aid, Tobit model 
Dependent variable: Efficiency scores Tobit model Tobit Model 
Initial level of primary completion rate 
 
0.00237*** 
  
(0.000207) 
Urban  population in % GDP 0.00229** 0.00129** 
 
(0.000999) (0.000645) 
Quality of Regulation 0.0482*** 0.0492*** 
 
(0.0167) (0.0111) 
Conflit variable dummy -0.00813 -0.00361 
 
(0.0148) (0.00679) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.0573*** -0.0135 
 
(0.0166) (0.0111) 
Initial level of aid to education 
 
-0.0268*** 
  
(0.00374) 
Constant 0.531*** 0.663*** 
 
(0.0892) (0.0555) 
Observations 161 141 
F-Test 52.29 83.62 
Number of Uncensored 151 131 
Right censored 0 0 
Left censored 10 10 
Log Likelihood 178.7 218.4 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Primary completion rate 157 57.15931 18.6187 19.99717 102.2704 
Aid in % of GDP 155 17.15925 21.82607 0.4125504 222.6818 
Aid to primary education in % of GDP 157 0.5542791 0.5121493 0.0004156 2.428168 
Aid to education% of GDP 157 0.5477999 0.4976255 0.0004156 2.421705 
Log(GDP per capita host countries) 157 9.368681 0.9442343 7.478229 10.6151 
Saving in % of GDP 157 15.7828 11.77537 -40.215 56.11615 
FDI in % of GDP 157 4.889647 6.735664 -4.302265 46.8288 
GDP per capita 157 637.0532 825.9532 83.09156 4160.078 
Democracy index-Polity4 157 1.872611 5.168601 -9 8 
Governance effectiveness 157 -.6230389 0.5100728 -1.773713 0.7272455 
Control of Corruption 157 -.509133 0.5127171 -1.430168 1.249669 
Pupil to teacher ratio 157 46.18039 12.02089 19.26821 82.79789 
 
Table A4: Descriptive statistics, Botswana 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Primary completion rate 8 95.04062 2.228748 90.95621 98.98571 
Aid to education per capita 9 .0869176 .0593788 .015311 .2001466 
GDP per capita 11 3815.366 357.0072 3204 4219.646 
Governance effectiveness 10 .5834893 .0721504 .5102532 .7272455 
Control of Corruption 10 .9244983 .1920662 .6060068 1.249669 
Pupil to teacher ratio 8 25.97866 .5710161 25.22265 26.72295 
 
Table A5: Descriptive statistics, Niger 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Primary completion rate 11 29.42712 9.159605 17.92173 40.68732 
Aid to education per capita 9 1.320889 .7824656 .3105139 2.622225 
GDP per capita 11 171.4778 4.804208 164.6489 180.0839 
Governance effectiveness 10 -.8252304 .1232776 -1.084863 -.6864156 
Control of Corruption 10 -.8263506 .1496113 -1.067721 -.6098286 
Pupil to teacher ratio 11 40.97828 1.709212 38.61445 43.6949 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Robustness check, with Logit transformation of aid 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOGIT(Primary completion rate) First step  
First step 
 
Saving in % of GDP 0.007 -0.000*** 0.007 -0.000** 
 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
FDI in % of GDP 0.015 -0.000 0.015 -0.000 
 
(0.011) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.926*** 0.040*** -2.525*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.642) (0.005) (0.944) (0.005) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.024 -0.000 0.029 0.000 
 
(0.039) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) 
Governance effectiveness 1.012*** 0.005 1.099** 0.002 
 
(0.362) (0.003) (0.467) (0.003) 
Control of Corruption -0.561* -0.002 -0.647* -0.001 
 
(0.292) (0.003) (0.338) (0.002) 
Pupil to teacher ratio 0.020* 0.000 0.020 -0.000 
 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
Log(GDP per capita host countries) 2.473***   2.841***   
  (0.374)   (0.462)   
Log(Aid to education per capita)  
0.006*** 
  
  
(0.001) 
  
Log(Aid to primary education per capita)   
0.005*** 
        (0.001) 
N 176 176 157 157 
No of countries 
 
27.000 
 
27.000 
F-stat for weak ident. 
 
43.657 
 
37.762 
Shea R2   0.236   0.236 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Efficiency scores 
Country Observations Efficiency score, 2000-2010 Return to scale Rank 
Botswana 6 1.000000 drs 1 
Kenya 2 1.000000 drs 2 
Togo 3 1.000000 - 3 
Namibia 7 0.982326 drs 4 
Gambia, The 7 0.942845 drs 5 
Ghana 8 0.939014 drs 6 
Congo, Rep. 6 0.929048 drs 7 
Tanzania 6 0.924438 drs 8 
Lesotho 8 0.922256 drs 9 
Swaziland 6 0.906117 irs 10 
Liberia 2 0.900858 irs 11 
Uganda 7 0.893751 irs 13 
Cameroon 8 0.892474 irs 14 
Madagascar 4 0.876592 irs 15 
Benin 5 0.867066 irs 16 
Mauritania 5 0.860313 irs 17 
Senegal 7 0.849871 irs 18 
Guinea 8 0.848100 irs 19 
Mali 8 0.836211 irs 20 
Ethiopia 2 0.802812 irs 21 
Burundi 6 0.793622 irs 22 
Chad 7 0.788106 irs 23 
Mozambique 7 0.783889 irs 24 
Rwanda 4 0.768073 irs 25 
Burkina Faso 8 0.762951 irs 26 
Niger 4 0.741436 irs 27 
Note: Final sample from 2SLS. Note that drs: decreasing return to scale, irs: increasing return to scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6: List of countries 
Country                                    Observations 
Benin 7 
Botswana 8 
Burkina Faso 10 
Burundi 9 
Cameroon 9 
Central African Republic 7 
Chad 9 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 
Congo, Rep. 7 
Ethiopia 10 
Gabon 1 
Gambia, The 7 
Ghana 10 
Guinea 10 
Guinea-Bissau 2 
Kenya 2 
Lesotho 10 
Liberia 2 
Madagascar 6 
Malawi 10 
Mali 10 
Mauritania 6 
Mozambique 9 
Namibia 9 
Niger 6 
Nigeria 5 
Rwanda 6 
Senegal 9 
Sudan 7 
Swaziland 8 
Tanzania 7 
Togo 5 
Uganda 8 
Zambia 8 
Zimbabwe 3 
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